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Letter From the editors
Dear Readers,
Since the journal’s start in early 2020, the mission of
The Commons has been to map meaning onto political
phenomena through systematic, often interdisciplinary,
inquiry. We have been so grateful for the opportunity to
spotlight student scholarship that charts, challenges, and
deepens knowledge through research and writing. While
research remains a highly valuable venue to uncover facts
and consolidate findings, we recognize that other avenues for
academic exploration are necessary to expand our awareness
of our larger political world. For this Summer 2022 issue, we
are excited to publish an array of papers that take different
approaches to questions about power, place, and purpose in
a changing—or, perhaps, unchanged—political climate. This
collection of scholarship shows how we, as a publication, can
promote a fuller fount of early academic talent, while staying
true to our founding principle of uplifting important
interdisciplinary undergraduate work.
Included in this issue are perspectives on how the past
continues to inform our reckoning with the present. Ethan
Stern-Ellis draws on the disciplines of spatial mathematics,
computer science, and political science to discuss how
electoral districting in Ohio can be made more accurate,
addressing areas of improvement in previous algorithmic
models of political representation. Interested in exploring
how people actually “…inhabit and interact with space” and
how that revised knowledge informs how we define and
delimit our country electorally, this author and his team take
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stock of learnings from earlier experiments in architecting
their own solution, all while tackling the issues of
gerrymandering and electoral equity that inflect the
present political moment.
By bringing to bear the historical intricacies of the
five-day war between Russia and the Republic of Georgia,
Kris Bohnenstiehl engages with the Western ethos at the
root of an enduring power struggle that continues to
inform diplomatic relations. This author approaches this
case study from a micro and macro perspective,
establishing the significant precedent that engendered the
very political figures and configurations at the forefront of
Georgian state development and the country’s struggle
towards self-determination. Now more than ever, this
paper reminds us that localized conflict demands a global
discourse, and that the prospect of peace hinges on the
attention and commitment of more than any one, single
state actor.
Intersecting the fields of African American studies
and educational studies with a purposeful focus on
personal point-of-view, our third article critically
approaches a problematic pedagogical practice — in-class
“simulation” of or “hands-on” engagement with historical
events—and its place in perpetuating more subversive
shades of racism in America. Tending to topics of transgenerational trauma, historical memory, and personal
retrospection, Leona DeRango engages with “what [they]
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Letter From the editors
do not see” with regards to the past and the present,
reminding readers that race, politics, and history affect how
we see and seek knowledge of the past and “knowings” of
the now.
Publishing this outstanding scholarship would not be
possible without the support of our faculty reviewers,
faculty advisors, and administrative staff. We are especially
thankful for the support of Professor David Sousa and Irene
Lim, whose guidance and generosity helped carry us
through the challenges of resumed in-person meetings.
And, of course, we would like to express our deepest
gratitude to our Editorial Board. We are incredibly proud of
the work of our peers in not only curating this issue, but
expanding the goals of The Commons itself. By engaging in
conversations on the limits of accessibility within academia,
research, and pedagogy, The Commons staff demonstrated
a commitment to progress and innovation by pushing
critical theory well beyond the limits of a classroom. While
graduating is bittersweet, we know that we are leaving the
journal in excellent hands that will continue to shine light
on undergraduate scholarship that delves deep, delivers
insights, and disrupts our sense of our larger political world.

Essays

Sincerely,
Lila Bernardin & Hannah Williams
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Who sent the devil down to georgia?
An analysis of the causes of the russo-georgian war
Of 2008 And its effects on georgian democracy
KRIS BOHNENSTIEHL

GEORGIA: GOD’S COUNTRY

In the beginning, when God created the world, He set aside pieces of land
for the different people who would live on the new Earth. When he had
finished, all the nations of the world had a place to call their home, save one.
The Georgians had been celebrating the night before, and in their stupor had
missed the opportunity to claim a land of their own. Desperate, they came to
God and cried, “Oh Lord, last night we were feasting and celebrating in your
name, our great revelries made us oversleep and now we are without a home.”
Taking pity on them, God gave the Georgians the piece of land which He had
been saving for His own pleasure, stating that only His most devoted followers
should live in such a paradise. This popular myth marks the beginning of
nearly every conversation of Georgian history, for God’s favorite people have
since failed to prosper in their slice of paradise.
The origins of the Nation of Georgia have less of a divine provenance.
After the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire following the first World War, a
Georgian state emerged in 1918. However, by 1921 it had been swallowed by
the ravenous Soviets and amalgamated into their Union. The birthplace of
Joseph Stalin, Georgia remained firmly in the grip of the U.S.S.R. until its
independence in 1991, under nationalist President Zviad Gamsakhurdia.
Gamsakhurdia’s very short reign was characterized by conflict with the
breakaway territories of South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Adjara, each of which
officially existed within the official territorial boundaries of Georgia but had
been governed separately of Georgia as independent oblasts under the Soviet
Union. When Georgia declared independence in 1991 and centered its power
in the capital of Tbilisi, these territories rejected Georgian authority. Territory
elites remained desperate to cling onto the power they had held for so long and
disliked the prospect of losing their close and shady economic ties to Russia.
In late 1991, Gamsakhurdia was deposed due to his grating nationalismedging-on-fascism, and Eduard Shevardnadze took over as president.
Shevardnadze had been the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1985 until
the Union’s collapse in 1991, and brought with him many old practices of
governance. Corruption was rampant in Georgia, as Shevardnadze used both
the police force and a highly clientelistic system to dictate his will. He
revamped the power of the central state, which had been exceedingly weak
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under Gamsakhurdia.¹ From 1991 to 1995, Georgian GDP dropped by 130%,
and the bustling black-market economy only further undermined what little
authority the government had, with people promoted to prominent positions
through their willingness to maintain the status quo and maximize profits for
those in command.²
In 2003, Shevardnadze won reelection to the presidency in an election
that was obviously rigged, and the Georgian people had had enough. In what
has since been coined the Rose Revolution, protesters broke into the
parliament building during Shevardnadze’s acceptance speech armed only
with roses, causing the President to flee and declare a state of emergency.
Shevardnadze eventually stepped down, and in a hastily organized election,
Mikheil Saakashvili was elected to the post of president with 96% of the vote,
in what the OSCE called “the most fair elections since [Georgia’s]
independence.”³ Elected on promises of liberalization to combat corruption,
integration into NATO and the European Union, and territorial unification
with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Saakashvili enjoyed significant support not
just from many Georgians, but the United States and its allies as well. Eager to
expand east and undercut the returning influence of Russia in the region, the
Western allies saw Saakashvili as the perfect vessel to spread the values and
institutions of the liberal democratic world into the post-Soviet space.
This optimism was short-lived, for although Saakashvili made good on
many of his promises to combat corruption and improve the economic
conditions for Georgians, he began demonstrating many authoritarian
qualities that severely hurt his reputation and reception. Many Georgians
remained dissatisfied with the lack of plurality in their government, and
Saakashvili actively worked to silence oppositional voices, using media
censorship to great effect. And while Saakashvili had managed to reform the
police force and educational system to combat corruption, the Georgian
people still lived in extreme poverty. In 2007, a protest of 50,000 in Tbilisi was
dispersed by riot police, yet Saakashvili declared that the protest marked the
beginning of a new democratic society in Georgia. Despite this paradoxical
view, Saakashvili won reelection in 2008 in a race declared not particularly
fair by the OSCE. This victory was undercut by a short war with Russia in
August 2008, which doomed Saakashvili’s domestic and international
support. Paralyzed by his diminished popularity and humiliated by the ease
with which Russia had defeated his nation, Saakashvili oversaw an ineffective
administration until he lost the election in 2012 to Bidzina Ivanishvili and the
Georgian Dream Party, who received significant Western backing.
FALSE TRUTHS

The aim of this paper is to examine the degree to which Mikhail
Saakashvili was responsible for the August 2008 war, and to determine the
role which this loss played in his diminishing popularity and eventual electoral
defeat. Before getting too far ahead, it must be known that the war between
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Russia and Georgia remains one of the most prominent wars of disinformation
and deception in modern history, and accurate facts from the conflict are
difficult to find due to the highly biased and often deliberately misleading
reporting from both sides of the conflict. Since 2008, Russia has taken the
upper hand in this war of information and has effectively spread the narrative
that Saakashvili and Georgia were the aggressors of the war, while Russia only
acted in the interest of protecting its citizens from illegal Georgian attacks.
However as more information about the conflict has worked its way through
the net of propaganda, Russia’s narrative appears increasingly inaccurate. As
Russian poet Lev Rubinstein argues:
[Russia] clearly recognizes the new informationtechnology situation in the country and in the world,
counting only on deceiving those who are glad to be
deceived. Such people, to the great joy [of the current
Russian government] are extremely numerous. What
about those who “do not believe” the official line? They
do not believe and it is not necessary that they do — let
them sit at home and not come to our circus.⁴
From his first moments as Georgian President, Saakashvili made himself a
target of Russian attacks. His policies of Western integration and his professed
love for liberalism were directly inimical to the goals of the Russian
government seeking to reestablish its Cold War sphere of influence over the
region. Saakashvili’s turn to the West and dreams of integration into NATO
and the EU represented a threat to Russian hegemony and security,
paramount issues under Vladimir Putin’s reformed Russian ideology.⁵ The
materialization of Russia’s fears was the high level of support and close
personal relationships Saakashvili had with his Western counterparts, a
relationship which both Putin and Saakashvili believed would guarantee
Georgia’s entrance into NATO and exit from being in Russia’s shadow. This
confidence would result in catastrophe for Saakashvili, as he began to exhibit
significant authoritarian tendencies, believing the West would unequivocally
support his drive to liberalize the country, which was not the case. By 2008,
Saakashvili’s Western support had nearly dissipated; yet faced with increasing
Russian aggression, he continued to act with rash confidence based upon a
belief that the West would intervene and force Russia to back off before actual
conflict erupted. While Russian propaganda paints Saakashvili as aggressively
pursuing military solutions for reunification with Abkhazia and South Ossetia,
he actually made significant and concentrated efforts at peaceful reunification,
which were rejected numerous times by the puppet governments of the
territories acting at the will of a war-eager Russia. Although Saakashvili was
foolish to escalate the conflict through military mobilization, he was acting
reactively to Russian aggression and the West’s failure to support him. The
United States bears significant responsibility for the outbreak of war, since a
lack of concrete foreign policy around Russia froze its intelligence response,
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leaving the country unable to stop the conflict until it was too late.
Saakashvili’s dramatic loss of popularity both domestically and abroad
can be traced to his trends towards authoritarianism in the quest to liberalize
Georgia, not his aggressive actions which led to war, as Russian propaganda
would have it. Since 2008, the Georgian people have only increased their
support for Western integration through membership with NATO and the EU,
demonstrating that the people, and the West, were not dissatisfied with his
policies, but rather his procedures.
RUSSIAN POLICY LEADING TO WAR

For those who wanted to see it, war between Russia and Georgia was
certain by April of 2008, and Russian policy reflected this readiness. By
November 2007, Russia had withdrawn all of its troops from its bases in
Georgian territory in preparation for war.⁶ While this seemed like a step
towards easing tensions between the two countries, Russian officials worried
that when the war broke out many Russian soldiers would be trapped in these
bases, so they moved them out to be redeployed for the possible invasion. Not
long after, Russia withdrew from the Commonwealth of Independent States
(CIS) in early 2008, allowing for overt Russian military presence in Abkhazia
and Ossetia, which CIS decreed could only be occupied by Georgian troops.⁷
This was an overt violation of Georgian territorial integrity by Russian forces,
and as Russian “Peacekeepers” began selling arms and training local militias
in the region, it became clear that peace was not the priority for Moscow.
The most consequential event in the chain that led to war, however, was
created neither by Georgia nor Russia. In April 2008, at the NATO summit in
Bucharest, the Western powers recognized Kosovo as an independent state
and, in the same meeting, laid out a NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP) for
Georgia. While this plan seemed beneficial for Georgia, it set the course
straight to conflict for both Georgia and Russia, as the West failed to
understand the issue in full. As a part of the MAP, Georgia had to resolve all
territorial conflicts before it could be considered for NATO membership, and
Angela Merkle stated that: “Nations undergoing regional and internal conflicts
cannot become NATO members.”⁸ These were opportune circumstances for
Russia, as it now held the cards for Georgia’s Western integration--not a hand
to fold on. Russia’s deep-seated influence over the governments of both
Abkhazia and South Ossetia guaranteed that the fate of the territories would
be decided by Russia, and since that fate determined Georgia’s future of
integration, Russia had the means to prevent NATO membership. Saakashvili
was forced to decide between violent reunification and war with Russia, or
consignation of the status quo and surrender of the dream of joining the West.
Knowing that conflict was likely coming, Russia increased its military presence
on the border and in the territories, undertaking significant military drills to
simulate the coming war.⁹ Likewise, Georgia began conducting similar drills,
a foolish decision to play Russia by their word and create the possibility for a
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narrative of Georgian planned aggression. In July, Russia began sending statesponsored journalists to embed themselves in the areas of South Ossetia and
Abkhazia most likely to see conflict, so that they would have the lead in the
propaganda war which was to break out in conjunction with the actual
fighting.¹⁰ Foreign journalists were banned from the area, ensuring Russia
would have a complete monopoly on the coverage, and guaranteeing control
of the narrative.¹¹ Thus by summer of 2008, both sides were preparing for the
certain eventuality of war.
While there is concrete evidence that the Russian Government planned
for war as early as November of 2007, if war with Georgia was always the goal
of Moscow, then evidence shows that Russia had undertaken calculated
policies to force Georgia into war as early as 2002. Due to the Soviet Union’s
policy of affirmative action, the Abkhazians and Ossetians represented a
population minority yet were the elite majority in the respective territories
compared to the Georgians.¹² By 2001, there existed significant support for
reintegration with Georgia, particularly in South Ossetia, and the issue might
have been decided in the elections of 2001 where some leading presidential
candidates wanted to rejoin Georgia.¹³ However Russia remained the
dominant force both economically and politically, supplying between 90 and
98 percent of South Ossetia’s GDP between 2001 and 2008.¹⁴ Russia backed
the eventual winner Eduard Kokoity, a fervent separatist who made peaceful
unification with Georgia all but impossible while he was in power.¹⁵ Thus
Russia passed up on an opportunity to peacefully resolve one half of the
conflict, pointing towards a desire to stoke war. Guarantees of military support
between Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 2006 represent another policy
decision puppeteered by Russia to stoke potential conflict. In 2007, in what is
known as the Munich Speech, Vladimir Putin made Russia’s position on
Georgia clear: “Georgia may join NATO, but without Ossetia and Abkhazia,”
declared Putin, knowing full well he held the key to Georgian integration.¹⁶ At
the same time, he expressed a desire to “make an example out of Georgia [and
Saakashvili].”¹⁷
THE EXAMPLE OF SAAKASHVILI

Aside from the brewing border conflict, Putin and Russia had ample
reasons for disliking Mikheil Saakashvili. Putin’s desire to re-establish Russia
as the hegemonic power in the region was directly threatened by Saakashvili’s
desire to join NATO and extend Western influence. Therefore, conflict
between the two was likely from the moment Saakashvili was elected
president, and Abkhazia and Ossetia were welcome catalysts to instigate such
a battle. The Rose Revolution saw Saakashvili win the presidency with
overwhelming support and marked a dramatic shift from the status quo in the
post-Soviet landscape, and Georgia took it upon itself to market this revolution
as a break with the past and an embracement of modernity and democracy.
The initial years of Saakashvili’s tenure were indeed proof that such optimism
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was taking hold; Georgia’s GDP increased by 10% annually from 2004-08, and
there was hope that Georgia’s newfound economic strength would provide an
inherent solution to the issue of territorial integrity, as Ossetia and Abkhazia
might have wanted to join in on the prosperity.¹⁸ However, military
incursions into Ossetia to combat the rampant smuggling paralyzing the
economy stoked fears of a military takeover, and peaceful integration grew less
likely as time passed.¹⁹
On the domestic front, Saakashvili’s popularity was beginning to decline by
2006, as he began to exhibit characteristics of an authoritarian leader in his
frustration to accomplish his goals. Simultaneously, many of his economic
reforms were not working as promised, and unemployment and poverty
remained significant issues. While the police were no longer shaking down
people for bribes, the people were just as poor, and thus the circumstances
remained somewhat unchanged.²⁰ Meanwhile, Saakashvili began to increase
executive power and decrease the plurality of the government and society. His
party, known as the United National Movement (UNM), achieved dominance
over parliament in elections in which significant voter suppression and double
counting was reported, and oppositional voices in the media were gradually
silenced to supplement this effort.²¹ While initially the United States
unequivocally supported Saakashvili in his efforts to liberalize Georgian
society, news of these authoritarian tendencies gradually lessened Western
support. Yet Saakashvili seemed unaware that his position as a favorite of the
West was in jeopardy. In flashes of Realpolitik, Saakashvili seemed to
demonstrate the desire to liberalize and democratize Georgia through very
undemocratic means.
While the subversion of democratic checks rightly deserves general
condemnation, it is worth considering the difficulty of Saakashvili’s position.
When Saakashvili took power in 2004, Georgia was very much the economic
and societal basket case Russia had promoted it as through excessive
propaganda. Corruption and clientelism prevented any substantive
cooperation between the already ineffective branches of government, and an
absence of foreign direct investment prevented the establishment of
constructive institutions able to promote any kind of democratic transition. If
Georgia were a car, it was without an engine or any wheels, but the
incompetent driver continued to feed it fuel. When Saakashvili took over, the
car got a new driver, but remained in its dilapidated state. His promises of
liberalization and a commitment to democracy sounded good to the desperate
Georgians; however, nobody had any conception of what a liberal democratic
society looked like nor how to achieve it. Saakashvili inherited a country with
totally ineffective institutions and bureaucracy and promised to magically
make it function. His failure, while tragic, was entirely expected. Above all,
Saakashvili’s presidency begs the question as to whether institutional
cooperation is a natural prerequisite to a democratic society or not. How can a
democracy, with its various checks and balances, operate without united
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collaboration between its various institutions? Saakashvili was clearly
confounded by this question, and eventually settled on establishing that
cooperation first (albeit very one-sided cooperation) and leaving
democratization to fill in the gaps.

violated international law, first by illegally staging troops in Ossetia and later
by advancing into Georgia and violating the small nation’s sovereign right to
territorial integrity.²⁴

This calculation demonstrates that Saakashvili believed he had the
unequivocal support of the West, and that the United States and its allies were
firmly committed to his vision for Georgia. Operating on this belief, he severely
overreached his power, and by the time his mistake had been realized, it was
too late for Georgia.²² While the Bucharest Summit did promise some military
aid for Georgia, the requirement of territorial unification put Saakashvili in an
unavoidable course for war with Russia, and the rejection of immediate NATO
membership meant that Georgia was without the security guarantees
necessary to achieve that goal. Therefore, while Saakashvili’s policy to
dramatically increase Georgian military spending was flagged by the alarmist
Russian media as an aggressive buildup, he was forced into this position to
protect his country from a threat no one else was taking seriously. Officially
this buildup was promoted in order to meet the entry requirements for NATO,
but this is not an accurate representation of what really happened. Since
NATO demanded the territorial reunification of Georgia, the country needed
to ramp up its military both in order to achieve the unification and to protect
itself from a response from Russia, who had overtly expressed its intention to
support Abkhazia and Ossetia with military force.²³ Saakashvili was very
foolish to mobilize and give Russia the excuse to act “defensively”; however if
the threat from Russia was as genuine as it seemed and the West had
continued to act recalcitrantly to the possibility of violence, mobilization may
well have been necessary to avoid national martyrdom at the hands of Russia.

Throughout this discussion of Russian and Georgian policies, the United
States and its European allies played a pivotal role. By 2008, NATO had
worked hard to establish itself as a fair arbiter of international and border
conflicts, raising questions as to why it failed to prevent war from breaking out
between Russia and one of its prospective members.²⁵ When Saakashvili was
elected to the presidency in 2004, the West rejoiced. A figure had finally
emerged in a post-Soviet territory who was willing to bring his country out of
the dark and into the modern world. The support from the West likely
influenced Saakashivili’s overwhelming electoral victory in 2004, and was
crucial to his initial success. Successful integration with the West required
relentless support, and thus for Saakashvili to make any progress, he had to
present himself as desirable to his Western counterparts. He was remarkably
successful at this rebranding of Georgia’s break from its past, and the West
responded by throwing unequivocal support behind him and his policies. But
by 2006, much of the fervor surrounding Saakashvili had worn thin, and many
in the West were beginning to have second thoughts as they observed his
efforts to reduce Georgia’s political plurality and the ineffectiveness of his
economic reform policies. However, the intimately personal relationship
which Saakashvili had formed with his Western allies meant they were
hesitant to reign in his authoritarian tendencies, further emboldening
Saakashvili to continue on the course that he had set.²⁶ The failure to
implement effective oversight and restraint on Saakashvili is not the apex of
the West’s failure to mitigate this conflict; however, it does indicate an
underlying issue facing America and its allies. There was no comprehensive
policy strategy to deal with the increasing threat posed by Russia, and the West
was terribly ignorant of the developments taking place in Georgia and the
Caucasus in general. Rather than supporting the institutionalization of
democracy and liberalization in Georgia, the West threw its support behind
the individual that they believed would achieve these goals, without taking the
necessary steps to understand the scope of the issue which was Georgia’s
Western integration.

Strangely enough, it was Saakashvili’s commitment to democracy that led
to this disaster, not his authoritarian tendencies. Saakashvili’s popularity and
legitimacy rested on his ability to make good on his campaign promises, of
which territorial unification was paramount. While he did not make things
particularly easy for himself by pursuing the centralization of authority in the
state, the dilapidated condition of the Georgian government and society did
not provide an enabling base from which to start. While the leadup to the war
and events during it worked to amplify his authoritarian tendencies, these
trends did not directly lead to the conflict. It is however worth considering that
with greater democratic oversight and plurality the decision to mobilize the
Georgian military might have been undertaken with more care, and Georgia
might have seen greater support from the West. While Saakashvili was a fool,
he should not be considered the main aggressor of the war with Russia.
Rather, Saakashvili was trapped by the hawkish opportunism of Russia
already plotting his downfall and the irresponsible policies of the West. While
the details of how the fighting broke out is hazy due to the vastly varying
accounts from the media on both sides, strong evidence points to Russia as
having fired the first shot; it was unequivocally Russia, not Georgia, who
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RECALCITRANCE

The first great failure of the West was to confuse the cause and effect of
Georgian-Western integration. In the early 2000s, Russia launched a horribly
violent war on its own breakaway region in the Caucasus: Chechnya. Despite
Chechen wishes to be independent of Russia, Putin took drastic actions to
quash the uprising, all but leveling the capital of Grozny and leaving just
20,000 inhabitants of its pre-war population of around 400,000.²⁷ Putin
seemingly believed that Russia still had the right to interfere in ethnic and
national conflicts within the perceived sphere of Russian influence, a behavior
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mirrored in the war with Georgia, the secession of Crimea, and just recently in
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. While at the very least the war in
Chechnya should have demonstrated to Western allies that Russia was willing
to embroil itself in violent ethnic conflict, there are greater considerations to
make regarding Abkhazia and South Ossetia. If Russia was willing to quell
calls for national self-determination within its own official borders, how could
it legitimately support the demand for independence in Abkhazia and South
Ossetia?
The West missed this paradox, and subsequently missed the mark when
Georgia came forward with the desire to join NATO and integrate into Europe,
as evidenced by the conflicting requirements laid out in Georgia’s MAP. The
MAP demanded that Georgia achieve territorial hegemony, showing that
NATO did not comprehend the source of the issue. It seems that the West was
willing to take Russia at its word that the territorial integrity of Abkhazia and
South Ossetia were important in and of themselves. NATO completely failed
to see that the real reason that Russia was interested in the status of these
territories was that their destabilization precluded Georgia from NATO
membership.²⁸ After the suppression of Chechen independence, Russian
hypocrisy was on full display, and it is confounding that the United States and
its allies did not notice that logical fallacy. If the West had been intent on
allowing Georgia to join NATO in 2008, the logical course would be to
streamline their membership and utilize this new alliance to deal with the
territorial conflict after the fact. Had this option been pursued, Russia would
have lost the leverage that it had on Georgia. Russia’s primary goal was to keep
Georgia out of NATO, and its strong influence over Abkhazia and South
Ossetia prevented such integration, making it its most effective weapon.
Consequently, Georgia’s call for help fell on deaf ears.
Further evidence of Western ignorance was made clear at the same
NATO summit in Bucharest that produced Georgia’s MAP: the recognition of
Kosovo as an independent state. The independence of Kosovo made sense in
the isolated context of the Balkans; however, wider geo-political consequences
existed and seemingly were not considered by the West. The United States
wished to use its newly gained strength post-Cold War to impose its will;
however, despite U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s confident
statement that “Kosovo cannot be seen as a precedent for any other situation
in the world today,” Russia certainly did not agree.²⁹ Kosovo provided Russia
with two weapons to use against Georgia. First it represented the very threat
of Western expansion which had galvanized Russia’s policy to prevent
Georgian integration. NATO was flexing its jurisdiction in a territory which
historically had operated in the Russian sphere of influence, which allowed
Putin to further his narrative of acting defensively in Russia’s interest. Second,
it allowed Russia to declare its support for the independence of Abkhazia and
South Ossetia by using the same precedence of national self-determination
which had influenced the West’s decision about Kosovo. While Western
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observers might have noted that Russia’s actions in Chechnya belied the
sincerity of this declaration, it slipped by unnoticed. The West seemed to take
Russia at their word, and Russian policy continued to find success while
characteristically subverting rational logic.
The final failure of the West was its willingness to swallow Russian
propaganda. The culmination of the short war was due to a Western
willingness to believe Russia's reasoning behind the war and its reporting on
what had happened during the conflict. Both Russia and Georgia had treated
the Information War, which shrouded the on-the-ground conflict, as equally
important as the actual fighting.³⁰ The widespread policy of the Western
powers regarding the war had been to wait for reliable information to emerge
after fighting broke out.³¹ While on the one hand this shows that the West
lacked a comprehensive plan from the beginning to deal with an eventual
conflict, it also shows why many people were so susceptible to obvious
propaganda.
Russian propaganda outlets relentlessly plugged the narrative that
Saakashvili and Georgia were the aggressors in the war and had violated the
CIS arrangements first, Russia was acting to protect its citizens in the
territories and that, given the precedent set by Kosovo, self-determination
overruled claims of territorial integrity.³² Georgia also forwarded its own
narrative through the media, claiming that it was Russia who had violated
international law by attacking sovereign Georgia and CIS arrangements made
Georgian peacekeeping forces in the territories legal, since they still lay within
Georgian and not Russian jurisdiction.³³ Georgia also denied that Russia was
protecting its citizens, claiming correctly that Russia had issued illegal
passports to people living in Ossetia and Abkhazia and had ignored Georgian
sovereignty.³⁴ While both sides are guilty of spreading disinformation,
Georgia had an accurate view of proceedings on these two points. Yet this was
not accepted as the narrative in the rest of Europe.
Several factors might have led to the promotion of the Russian narrative
over Georgia’s. First, bolstered by the victory in the armed conflict, Russia
remained committed to spreading its story long after the war had ended and
thus might have simply overwhelmed Georgia's attempts, which managed to
keep pace during the war but fell off once fighting had concluded.³⁵ Second,
Georgia’s methods during the Information War worked to delegitimize their
claims in the eyes of the democratic West. Saakashvili’s policy in the
information campaign was to act defensively, and nearly all Russian media
outlets were banned in Georgia, severely damaging its reputation as an opendemocratic society.³⁶
Finally, when all was said and done, Europe realized that defying Russia’s
will would have repercussions. Above all was Europe’s growing reliance on the
Russian state-owned natural gas giant Gazprom, which supplies over 40% of
the EU’s energy products.³⁷ This was probably foremost on the minds of the
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German government when they came out officially in support of Russia's
version of events.³⁸ The German argument was that Georgia had acted as the
aggressor in the conflict, since the peacekeeping provisions in the region
precluded the stationing of armed troops in the area, which Georgia
apparently violated in 2006.³⁹ Due to this violation, Russia was justified to
“expel” the Georgians who were cast as invaders, and subsequent attacks by
Georgians on Russian peacekeeping forces justified the escalation.⁴⁰

refugee crisis – which resulted from displaced people fleeing Abkhazia and
Ossetia – made economic reform nearly impossible despite Saakashvili’s best
effort.⁴⁷ The number of Georgians in support of joining NATO and the EU was
the other area which displayed growth, reaching 70% in 2008. This is the most
significant statistic, as it indicates that it was not Saakashvili’s policies that
were so unpopular with Georgians, but rather the methodology that he
deployed to accomplish his policy goals.

This line of justification is in line with the rhetoric spread by Russian
propaganda and was not reified by the facts on the ground. As stated earlier,
Georgia still maintained sovereignty over Ossetia and Abkhazia, and was
legally justified to deploy troops there. Germany’s argument ignores the
successive provocatory Russian attacks which led up to the war, including the
bombing of Georgian towns by Russian planes in 2006 and 2007.⁴¹ Finally, it
fails to recognize that Russia blatantly violated international law when the war
broke out, going beyond protecting its citizens by advancing into uncontested
Georgian territory and ignoring Georgia’s rights as a sovereign state.⁴²
Saakashvili was foolish to move Georgian troops into position for a war and
create the pretext for Russia to be “defensive”; however given that it was
Germany’s own leader Angela Merkel who had expressed the need for Georgia
to find a solution to its border conflict, this seems to be an unfair double
standard for Saakashvili.

Had Georgians been upset by the nature of the war with Russia, such
support would have decreased as it became clear that Western integration
would come at the cost of conflict with Russia. Instead, it seems that
Saakashvili’s authoritarian trends – which led to the lack of pluralization
parliament, the utilization of state resources to silence oppositional voices,
and resulted in rash actions including mobilizing the military without proper
preparation – led Georgians to elect Georgia Dream (GD) candidates Giorgi
Margvelashvili to the presidency and Bidzina Ivanishvili, Georgia’s richest
individual, to the post of Prime Minister in 2012. GD ran on very similar
platforms to UNM, including a predominance of Western integration and
territorial integrity; however, it was free of the influence of Saakashvili. In the
West, many countries including the United States had grown tired of
Saakashvili’s subversion of democratic norms, and they endorsed GD in the
elections.⁴⁸ Since Western integration was only possible with Western
support, Saakashvili was destined for defeat before the voting even began.

THE WAR’S EFFECT ON GEORGIAN DEMOCRACY

Saakashvili had just won another term as Georgian President when the
August War kicked off in 2008, and his loss of popularity by the time of his
eventual electoral defeat in 2012 was substantial. However, the chain of events
that preceded the war, and Saakashvili’s continuous displays of
authoritarianism, call into question just how significant the war was in his
dramatic drop in standing. Public opinion polls from 2003 to 2008 show a
dramatic drop in popular public support for Saakashvili among Georgians well
before the actual war began.⁴³ People’s trust in their government institutions
decreased by an average of 20% over that time, and by 2008, 48% of
Georgian’s felt that the government did not listen to its civilians.⁴⁴ By 2008,
people were fatigued from years of ineffective governance, and while
Saakashvili did enjoy statistically higher support among older Georgians,
younger generations were eager to find a new solution to Georgia’s liberal
crisis.⁴⁵
Two areas did display some growth during the period of 2003 to 2008,
shedding greater light on just how influential the war was on the Georgian
people’s desire to democratize. The first is fear of corruption, which decreased
from 72% when Saakashvili took power in 2004 to 39% in 2008.⁴⁶ While the
statistics on economic welfare remained largely unchanged, this change
showed that Saakashvili did take some meaningful steps towards liberalizing
Georgian society, and the trade embargo instituted by Russia along with the

https://soundideas.pugetsound.edu/thecommons/vol3/iss1/1
13

ESSAYS

CONCLUSION

Mikhail Saakashvili is a fascinating figure, and while he displays no lack
of shortcomings, his battle to establish democracy in Georgia has at least some
tragic elements. Upon being elected in 2004, the course of the conflict with
Russia was already decided. Georgia had very little agency in how the conflict
played out due to the determined disposition of Russia and the devastating
disinterest of the West. Georgians themselves had little choice in the sequence
of events resulting in war, but electing Saakashvili in 2004 was the logical
attempt of a nation in desperate need of reform. Zviad Gamsakhurdia had
tried to forge an independent path for Georgia free from both Russia and the
West, but his policies of top-down unification only resulted in the bottom-up
fragmentation of Georgian society. Eduard Shevardnadze represented the
adoption of the past and the favoritism of historical ties to Russia, but his
government was paralyzed by the corruption and clientelism that it fostered as
a legacy of its Soviet structure. The only remaining option for Georgians
seeking to make a better life for themselves was to break with the past and
embrace integration into the West. In 2004, Saakashvili promised to liberalize
a society which had never known true democracy, and although he enjoyed
almost unanimous initial support, it was not enough to overcome the
dilapidated state of Georgia’s institutions necessary for the functioning of a
fair and free democracy. Thus, while Saakashvili’s authoritarian actions
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worked to undermine his support and unravel his democratic dream, they
were the only actions available to a man elected on the promise of liberalizing
Georgia and integrating into the West.
Saakashivili foolishly overreached himself and walked into the trap that
had been carefully set up by Russia. While he is certainly guilty of raising the
expectations of Georgians desperate to see immediate meaningful change in
their lives, the impossibility of his predicament must also be recognized.
Saakashivili’s actions were that of a panicked leader left out to hang by the
West, blindsided by the lack of unequivocal support from Western allies in the
face of any Russian opposition. This panic was leveraged by Russia, who had
been quietly planning Georgia’s fall long before Saakashvili was even elected.
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The dehumanizing gaze

trauma of white slaveholders’ “repression” of Black spectatorship by banning
Black slaves from “staring” at them, and how “looking” in present-day
contexts connotes defiance of historical “domination strategies” deployed by
white people in power.⁴ I intend to only brush the surface of these topics
through the sharing of some examples of how silence, ignorance, and power
work together to perpetuate systems of dehumanization and the
dehumanizing gaze.

Race in the context of academic tourism
LEONA DERANGO

For the heart of the matter is always somewhere else than where it is supposed to be.
Trinh Minh-ha

Facts are not created equal: the production of traces is always also the creation of silences.
Michel-Rolph Trouillot

This miseducation would involve the deliberate, ethically sanctioned production of
ignorance in folks of all races, too often with concomitant dehumanizing notions…
Lucius Outlaw

[It] is we in academia who alone hold the key to the definition of race, and therefore
to the classificatory logic of the acronym N.H.I.
Sylvia Wynter

I start with critical theorist Sylvia Wynter because I have questions. How
can we understand the classificatory logic that is produced through education?
How does education play a role in insistent dehumanizing? How can we hold
disciplines of knowledge accountable for these dehumanizing classifications?
How do we undo and relearn what race is? Sylvia Wynter seeks to find a
response in academia, in language, and in the classification of “No Humans
Involved (NHI).”¹ NHI is a classification of marginalized individuals that
reduces the humanity of such individuals, which produces a conscious gaze of
dehumanization.²
In this essay, I will explore the definition of race in the context of
academic tourism and the dehumanizing gaze that it casts. Academic tourism
is the inspection of others' trauma in the name of hands-on learning. This is a
practice that forces students and teachers to learn about experiences of harm
with the intent of “diversifying education”, usually without doing the work to
unpack or think critically about the history in which such experiences are
rooted. Academic tourism has appeared in my own educational experiences
and persists in educational programing, workplaces, and popular culture. Our
understanding of the dehumanizing gaze is informed by concepts that have
been explored by Toni Morrison and bell hooks on the white gaze: an
expectation that whiteness is present, observing, therefore marking
importance. Morrison spoke in opposition to the white gaze, advocating for
the empowerment of Black narratives rather than the appeasement of whitecentered or white-serving narratives that blanket American society.³ In “The
Oppositional Gaze: Black Female Spectators”, hooks discusses the historical
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First, I will discuss how ignorance in our education system makes us
complicit in the dehumanizing gaze.⁵ I will think through this by reflecting on
my own ignorance in the classroom. I then will move to examining how history
produces not only facts, but silence.⁶ Such silence reinforces ignorance and
the denial of the dehumanizing gaze. Connecting to historical events, I will
then interrogate the injustices of the Philadelphia MOVE bombing in 1985 and
the treatment of the bones of a Black child. Lastly, I will argue that, through
silence and ignorance, the dehumanizing gaze is reinforced. This can be seen
in education in educational programs within our American carceral system,
and the ways in which non-incarcerated and incarcerated individuals interact
to create systems of control and invasion through the dehumanizing gaze.
I revisit the question: what is race? In the context of the dehumanizing
gaze: race is silence, ignorance, and power. They build off each other to
oppress, control, and invade the way we think, act, and belong in society.
Embedded in my argument are explorations of the disciplines of anthropology,
history, and philosophy, in addition to reflections on experiences of my own
with and within education and educational systems.
IGNORANCE: WHO AM I?

It is important for you, my audience, to know where I am coming from. I
am a white, cisgender woman from a middle-class family. I attended public
school in St. Paul, Minnesota and now study African American Studies at the
University of Puget Sound. My definition of race is informed by my
socialization as a white person in American society. Therefore, I have chosen
to narrow my focus of race to discuss how people are complicit in racialization
that perpetuates a dehumanizing gaze. We have been taught and socialized as
white people that we are non-racialized—this is not true. We have the privilege
and comfort of being part of the dominant society to see ourselves as the
standard and non-racialized, whereas people of color are almost always seen
as “having a race.”⁷
I am jumping back to 2018. I am a high school senior at Open World
Learning Community taking AP U.S. History. I walk into class and the room is
rearranged. We are told that we are going to learn about the trans-Atlantic
slave trade by engaging in an activity. “Oh, fun,” I think, “A break from sitting
at a desk and listening to a lecture.” My teacher splits our class into groups and
asks us to “travel” around the classroom. Each corner of the classroom
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represents a different part of the transatlantic slave trade: one corner is
Europe, another Africa, and another North America. Walking around the
classroom to different corners, we pretend that we are participating in the
historical exchange of manufactured goods, such as tobacco and guns, for
slaves.
At the time, this activity seemed like an exciting way to engage with
course content. However, educational role-playing of this kind preserves the
production of ignorant knowledge. As philosopher Lucius Outlaw points out,
“Education became a principal means by which to affect the production,
mediation, and legitimation of ignorance-sustaining knowledge, via schooling
especially, that would achieve this defining and ordering.”⁸ My teacher was
ignorant of the harm that “touring” Black trauma of trans-Atlantic
enslavement by way of touring, not thinking critically, about Black slaves’
organization and “ordering” within in the economy could cause. Through her
position of relative power, she chose, perhaps from a place of ignorance, to
present a racialized narrative as a statement of fact, which thus imparted
“ignorance- sustaining knowledge” unto students as a matter of meeting
curricular objectives. Today, I ask myself, “How did I not know?” I did not
know because I was taught not to know. Knowledge is power, but in the center
of epistemological power lies ignorance and silence.
Looking back on that day in my AP U.S. History class, I realize today that
I was complicit in this production of ignorant knowledge that led to the
“defining and ordering of race.”⁹ At the time, I did not think twice about the
activity at hand: in fact, I was excited and eager. I did not object to or critique
my teacher. Unwittingly, I participated in “touring” Black trauma in the form
of an interactive history lesson. I was not taught how this traumatic history
constructs our current racial realities. The historical narrative of
“dehumanization” was silenced and controlled through ignorance right before
my eyes. Critically, the teacher of my AP U.S. History class was a white woman,
and most, if not all, of my peers were white. The presence of the white gaze
stripped Blackness and Black people of humanity and spun it into a subject of
study just as several Ivy League universities did when they offered an
archaeology course in which a Black bombing victim’s bones were unethically
examined for “educational” purposes.
SILENCE: LIES BEHIND THE IVORY TOWER

In April 2021, an anthropology course titled “Real Bones: Adventures in
Forensic Anthropology” was suspended when the silences of the past erupted
a conversation about the origin of the bones and their longstanding ownership
by the Ivy League. In May 1985, the Philadelphia Police Department bombed
a residence located in a primarily Black neighborhood in West Philadelphia.
Residents included members of the MOVE Organization, an anarchist
organization which participated in communal living.¹⁰ Six adults and five
children, all Black, died due to a fire caused by the bombing. Decades later,
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official representatives of Princeton University and the University of
Pennsylvania issued statements admitting to the storage, use, and exchange of
the remains of an unidentified child from the MOVE bombing over a nearly
forty-year period.¹¹ Studying the child’s remains became a part of the
aforementioned “Real Bones: Adventures in Forensic Anthropology” course
offered at Princeton University.¹² Revelations about the provenance of the
child’s remains rocked Philadelphia’s activist communities and survivors of
the 1985 incident, some of whom were unaware of the location and
unauthorized use of the child’s bones until mid-2021.¹³
A review of such history prompts several questions. Why do the Black
bodies and voices in this story not have ownership or control over their own
narrative and physical bodies? How is it that, in the past few years, we are only
now dealing with the consequences of the mismanagement of this horrific
event? How is it that we live in a world that allows Black trauma to be a form
of education?
The broad answer can be racism. However, there are more intricate
factors at play here that enabled the “Real Bones” course to be taught. The
existence of the course relied on the complicity and trust of enrolled students
not to question the content, on the willful ignorance of staff and faculty
involved in its approval and administration, and on the construction of
silences that were not intended to be uncovered.¹⁴ The reproduction of
ignorant knowledge allowed Princeton University to keep telling dominant
historical narratives that keep oppressed knowledge in the dark.¹⁵ The
silences that were created alongside a culturally revered system of knowledge
production — Ivy League institutions — kept the remains of children from
their families and in the hands of prestigious universities that perpetuated the
teaching of ignorance for decades. In turn, these universities reproduced the
dehumanizing gaze and the oppression of Black Americans.
POWER: EDUCATION IN THE AMERICAN CARCERAL SYSTEM

Through silence and ignorance, power is produced: the power to invade,
to control, and to oppress. An example of this can be found in the American
carceral system and its relationship to education. In 2018, a two-year
community college in the Midwest offered a course associated with the
Sociology Department in which non-incarcerated students engaged with
course content alongside incarcerated students. The course description
included some of the following language: “[s]pend time in a correctional
facility”, “earn 3 credit hours while you do it”, “…[will be] unlike any class you
have ever had.”¹⁶ This course advertisement was an explicit form of academic
tourism. While the course itself may have promoted integrative experiences
between incarcerated and non-incarcerate students, the language of the
advertisement seemed to portray the course as a “hands-on” experience for the
education of the non-incarcerated. The language implied that nonincarcerated students would be going into a prison setting and interacting with
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incarcerated individuals as if those individuals themselves and the conditions
of their incarceration were objects of study. While there are ways to go about
dual-status education in a productive way, it is difficult to find a balance when
we talk about the way that we value imprisoned people’s lives. Similar to
Princeton University and its treatment of a Black child’s bones as an
“adventure”, this higher education institution framed the dehumanization of
Black bodies as a unique educational experience for non-incarcerated
individuals.
Our current prison system is an intentional replication of slavery. Central
to the prison system’s continued existence is legislation and common
epistemological practices that result in high arrest and incarceration rates of
people of color, as well as the redefinition of incarcerated individuals’
citizenship rights comparable to that of slaves. Additionally, private prison
industries embedded within the larger carceral state profit from an
incarcerated person’s slave status and a steady supply of people to be
incarcerated. Building off of this concept, I argue that, due to the station and
situation of incarcerated individuals relative to those of the non-incarcerated
students, students coming into the prison for educational purposes would be
able to assert their assumptions and knowledge over inmates and further
enforce their power in the hybridized classroom-prison setting. This can be
seen in the way that these two identities are socialized in terms of their
respective senses of self. In prison, the “insider” incarcerated person is
stripped of their previous identity and fundamental liberties and intrinsically
linked to their crime. The “outsider” student, conversely, enters the prison
setting positioned to seek out self-fulfilling, identity-affirming opportunities ,
as they are invited to “…explore themselves and their worlds as college
students and to try new things.”¹⁷ This dichotomy projects an inherent power
dynamic between non-incarcerated students and their incarcerated
counterparts, and adds to the dehumanization of people in prison through
“educational invasion.” When students are not able to access the silenced
knowledge and see the lineage from slavery to prison, knowledge and
ignorance are produced, reinforcing traumatic and repetitive power dynamics
within educational settings. This power is silent, able to go undetected.
However, as Trouillot tells us, when there is a creation of facts there is also a
creation of silences.¹⁸

educational experiences. Such a course could have been a source of
departmental pride, or could have satisfied genuine scholarly curiosity.
However, its impact has engendered different feelings: anger, mistrust, and
dehumanization. There is always some type of heart in the matter. This idea of
“intention versus impact” is prominent and important when dealing with
issues of the heart. It is ignorant to assume the impact of something because
with every intention is silence, which is something that we do not know, and
feelings that are unaccounted for. Now, I will state my intention and look for
the impact.
I have connected silence, ignorance, and power in the context of
academic tourism in hopes of showing how race and its classificatory logic are
dehumanizing. There is not a single root of the dehumanizing gaze. To identify
a single root is ignorant in and of itself. One must see the many routes that
have led us to face the same issues of “unhumaning” time and time again.
Keeping bell hooks’ musings on Black spectatorship and power in mind, we
must meditate on “the ways power as domination reproduces itself in different
locations employing similar apparatuses, strategies, and mechanisms of
control.”¹⁹
Even as I write this paper, I am complicit in this dehumanizing gaze, even
if it is subconscious. It is my goal to chart this awareness and take
responsibility for the silences, ignorance, and power that I have been taught.
Outlaw writes, “We need among other things, a very substantial reeducation
and redirection of knowledge workers and knowledge work in academic
philosophy.”²⁰ I need to be reeducated. Therefore, I have chosen to pursue a
degree in African American Studies to challenge myself to think critically
about the whys and hows, as well as to implement a new lens of awareness and
humility. We all need to be asking the question: what is it that I do not see?

CONCLUSION: CARE AND HUMILITY

When thinking about the topic of race and when trying to define race, the
heart is always present. We lie to ourselves when we claim that there is no
emotion or feeling behind an action or a thought. I circle back to the example
of faculty members at Princeton University administering an anthropology
class centered around the examination of human remains of a Black bombing
victim whose family did not consent to such use. The intention of faculty
members at Princeton University could have been to provide unique
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Balancing Populations of
Electoral Districts
ETHAN STERN-ELLIS

PART I – INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this project is to help think about different ways of
creating electoral districts in the United States. Rethinking how to draw
districts can hopefully further the discussion on the problems that
redistricting and gerrymandering pose to the United States. Gerrymandering
is the drawing of electoral district lines to favor one group over another, which
is a potential consequence of the routine process of redrawing district lines.
The redrawing process happens every ten years when the US Census is carried
out in order to account for population changes that may affect how
populations are represented electorally. Gerrymandering is a threat to US
democracy since many states allot the drawing of district lines to their state
legislatures, allowing politicians who may redraw districts in order to satisfy
personal or partisan objectives. One question that comes up through the
process of redrawing districts, therefore, is what counts as a district that is
drawn fairly.
To answer this question, one criterion that should be considered is the
compactness of districts. Generally, districts should be as compact as possible.
This has led non-politically motivated analysts to use a euclidean measure of
space between groups of people. A euclidean distance is defined as the distance
between two points using the straight-line distance formula. This kind of
measure might be problematic since it does not take into account potential
geographical or physical obstacles that can separate communities. For
example, if the distance between group A and group B is one mile, but there is
a mountain without a tunnel that would connect the two groups, then the realworld distance traveled from A to B would be much greater. A euclidean
measure for the distance between A and B, therefore, is an inaccurate
representation of how these groups of people would be connected by distance.
One potential solution to this misrepresentation of space is to use travel
time as the measurement of distance when creating the boundaries of each
district. The Spatial Models and Electoral Districting Research Experience for
Undergraduates (SMED REU) of 2019 attempted this, using the state of Ohio
as their model. They remodeled the districts by using multidimensional
scaling (MDS) and a clustering algorithm. The clusters, in this case, are the
congressional districts in Ohio. However, in Ohio, each district must satisfy
two constraints: first, they must be contiguous; second, they must be balanced
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by population as determined by the Ohio legislature. Contiguity in this case
means that each electoral district in a cluster must touch the border of another
district from the same cluster. Population balance means that each cluster’s
total population must be within plus or minus five percent of the average
population for all clusters. In this case, that means that the range is from
684,980-757,082 people. The initial methods used by the SMED REU, which
will be discussed in more depth in the next section, made it difficult to satisfy
the population constraint. Building off of the work that the SMED REU
completed, this project aimed to satisfy the population constraint by
implementing an algorithm that clusters districts using the MDS data while
balancing the populations of each district.
PART II – RELATED WORK

The SMED REU of 2019 was directly built from the work of former
University of Washington professor of geography Richard Morrill. In 1972,
Morrill was tasked with hand-drawing the legislative and congressional
districts for the State of Washington.¹ Four years later, Morrill was able to
access new computer technologies that allowed him to gather travel time data
for these districts.² He used this data to create computer models of the
districts in order to compare them to his original drawings.³ Morrill found
that, on average, the computer models created districts that were more
compact with regards to population and more efficient in how they were
divided.⁴ The SMED REU team drew from Morrill’s work in order to find
comparisons between the 2010 maps of Ohio and their own computer models.
Their goal was to be able to model Ohio’s districts using travel time data in
order to more accurately represent how Ohio residents inhabit and interact
with space, allowing analysts to uncover potential problems with Ohio’s
existing maps.
As stated in the previous section, this project directly builds off of the
work that was done by the SMED REU of 2019. In particular, the SMED REU
team compiled all points to all points travel time data from Ohio using
OpenStreetMap, an online mapping system. While compiling this data, the
team generated a 9232 by 9232 matrix, which they then reduced to eleven
dimensions using multidimensional scaling. After reducing the data, they ran
the matrix through Python’s K-means package, setting the initial centroids as
the centroids from the 2010 US census. A centroid defined in this case is the
point that is the mean distance between all of the points of a cluster. Running
K-means on the MDS data generated sixteen clusters, representing Ohio’s
congressional districts. These clusters were almost contiguous, but not within
Ohio’s population requirements. In order to satisfy both Ohio’s contiguity and
population constraints, the SMED REU team took the data after K-means
finished running and attempted to modify it to meet the constraints. They
were able to satisfy the contiguity requirements, but were unable to meet the
population requirements.

STERN-ELLIS

17

28

The Commons: Puget Sound Journal of Politics, Vol. 3, Iss. 1 [2022], Art. 1
Researchers have tried to tackle the problem of clustering groups given
certain constraint requirements. Graphically weighted regression (GWR) and
automatic zoning procedures (AZP) are two techniques that exist for this task.
A 2014 analysis produced by Professor of Computational Spatial Science
Stewart Fotheringham of Arizona State University and others stated that, “In
essence, GWR measures the inherent relationships around each regression
point i, where each set of regression coefficients is estimated by weighted least
squares.”⁵ The coefficients in this case would be the population constraint, and
GWR would model the relationship between Ohio’s travel time data and the
population at a given regression point i. Alternatively, the AZP technique
would contiguously aggregate spatial data for a given number of zones (which,
in this case, would be electoral districts) into a given number of regions
(which, in this case, would be congressional districts). The AZP algorithm was
further developed to include equality and inequality constraints.⁶ For this
project, GWR was not used, since the SMED REU used K-means and this
project intends to expand on the work of SMED REU. A Python package for the
AZP technique was examined for this project, but it was abandoned after we
found that documentation for the AZP implementation that we were
considering was no longer supported. Instead, this project drew its inspiration
from a 2001 paper written by Professor of Statistics Giuseppina Damiana
Costanzo of University of Calabria, in which Costanzo describes a modified Kmeans algorithm.⁷ In particular, this paper shows a version of K-means where,
at each iteration of K-means, the algorithm was updated based on different
constraints.⁸ From this paper, we decided to implement a K-means algorithm
by hand that updates the clusters created by K-means at each iteration based
on the population constraint.
PART III – METHOD
K-MEANS IMPLEMENTATION

In this section, we will first discuss the K-means algorithm that we used
for this project and then transition into discussing how we attempted to
implement a population check at each iteration of K-means. Much of the code
used for our K-means algorithm was drawn from the work of programmer
Harrison Kinsley.⁹ The K-means algorithm begins by picking initial centroids.
There are sixteen centroids, since there are sixteen congressional districts in
Ohio. The centroids that were chosen initially are the same centroids that were
used in the 2010 census. The algorithm then enters a loop where two actions
occur. First, the distance between each data point to each centroid is
calculated. The data point is then assigned to the cluster whose centroid to
which it is closest. Second, for each cluster, a new centroid is assigned based
on the average distances between every data point in the cluster. These actions
occur for either X number of iterations, or until the centroids do not move
more than a predefined threshold that was set at .001 per Kinsley’s
recommendation. We tested the algorithm for correctness using a version of
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unit tests, where the algorithm was broken up into small sections and verified
for correctness through the use of mock data and print statements.
POPULATION CHECK

We then implemented three versions of the population check. The
population check comes directly after the data points are assigned to clusters.
Together, K-means and the population check make up the whole algorithm.
For clarity, the entire algorithmic process will be outlined, and then the three
versions of the population check will be discussed. The entire process of the
algorithm is as follows:
1.

Start by initializing the centroids.

2.

Assign the data points to clusters.

3.

Check the populations of each cluster.

4.

Recalculate the centroids.

5.

Repeat steps 2-4 for the given number of iterations or until the
centroids do not move more than the predefined threshold.

Population Check V0 – The first version of our population check goes
through a fairly straightforward process involving two steps. First, out of all
the clusters that were computed at the previous iteration of K-means, the
check identifies the cluster with the largest population. Let us call this cluster
C. Then, the check reduces the population size of cluster C until it is within the
population threshold required by the State of Ohio. It does this by moving the
data points that are farthest away from the centroid to the cluster they were
second closest to when they were originally assigned to cluster C.
Population Check V1 – The second version of our population check does
the same process as the first version, barring one modification. In this version,
when picking the largest population, all the clusters that were modified in the
previous iteration of K-means are excluded from selection. For example,
suppose that cluster C1 is picked as the cluster with the largest population in
the first population check. Then, suppose that data points are moved from C1
to clusters C2 and C3. In the second population check, clusters C1, C2, and C3
would then be excluded from selection as the cluster with the largest
population.
Population Check V2 – The third version of our population check again
does the same process as the first version, barring one modification. This time,
after the cluster with the largest population is selected, the population
reduction ends after one of two conditions becomes true: either the population
is reduced to the required size, or a given number of data points are moved.
When we tested, we used either 50 or 100 data points as the maximum number
for points that could be moved.
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Figure 1: The results of algorithm Population Check V0 after 1 iteration.

Figure 2: The results of algorithm Population Check V0 after 300 iterations.

PART IV – RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

iteration. The cluster with the smaller population, instead of the cluster with
the largest population, was selected as the cluster with the largest population.
Consequently, the cluster with the smaller population passed some of its data
points back to the cluster with the largest population. Between iterations 300
and 3000, we noticed that this process happened continuously.

The discussion of the results of the algorithm will begin by showing the
results of Population Check V0 after several different iterations of the
algorithm. We will begin by showing the results after one iteration.
The first map, Figure 1, shows the results of Population Check V0 after
one iteration. It is useful to present this map as it provides a baseline for
comparison to the second and third maps. The legend format follows a specific
pattern: from left to right, each entry begins with a color, the cluster that is
associated with that color, and the total population for that cluster.
The second map, Figure 2, shows the results of Population Check V0 after
300 iterations of the algorithm. Compared to the first iteration, 9 out of the 16
clusters got closer to the population threshold required by the State of Ohio.
This was a promising result, so we tested the algorithm after 3000 iterations.
The third map, Figure 3, shows the results of Population Check V0 after 3000
iterations of the algorithm. Compared to 300 iterations, 9 out of the 16 clusters
again got closer to the population threshold, but with significantly lower
returns.
This prompted us to examine the output between iteration 300 and
iteration 3000. A worrying pattern emerged. During the first iteration, a
cluster with the largest population passed some of its data points to a cluster
with a smaller population, thus reducing the size of the largest cluster’s
population. This was expected. The problem was revealed during the second
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To try to tackle this problem, we implemented Population Check V1 and
Population Check V2 respectively (see Part III). For Population Check V1, the
same problem of population swapping between two clusters arose. For
Population Check V2, reducing the number of data points that could be moved
proved to be problematic as well. In particular, this prevented the centroids
from moving very much after they were recalculated in Step 4 of the algorithm,
ending the overall algorithm before the populations could be balanced.
PART V – CONCLUSION

Clearly, the results from this algorithm do not accomplish the task of
balancing the populations of each cluster to meet the requirements of the State
of Ohio. However, the idea of having a K-means algorithm that modifies the
populations of clusters at each iteration is still promising, as there are other
methods of checking the population that can be implemented. The question
that remains is whether or not this is an improvement from using Python’s Kmeans package before modifying the data to meet the constraints. We believe
that it is, as this method gives the programmer more freedom in addressing
the problem of checking population balance and contiguity. Even if checking
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Figure 3: The results of algorithm Population Check V0 after 3,000 iterations.

the population at each iteration of K-means is a flawed way to approach this
problem, having a baseline K-means algorithm allows the researcher to
change directions with relative ease instead of being forced to modify data
after K-means has run its course.
PART VI – FUTURE WORK

The next steps for this project are twofold. First, instead of excluding
clusters from the previous iteration the way that the Population Check V2
does, it may be useful to exclude specific data points. This should be the next
change to the current algorithm. Second, future work should involve
implementing a contiguity check. We imagine that this would occur at each
iteration as is the case for the population check.
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